杨松武 摘 要 在 “渐进式”制度转轨的大背景下，经理人代理成本与控股股东代理成本并存是我国股份公司独有的经济现象。从理论上看，两类代理成本并存，不但对原有代理成本研究框架发生冲击，而且对公司治理机制的作用发挥也提出了严峻挑战。毕竟，仅仅围绕如何降低经理人代理成本或者控股股东代理成本的研究思路很难适用于两类代理成本问题分析；同时，公司治理机制不能平行且均衡地作用于两类代理成本，也将导致公司治理机制的作用效果评价成为一道难题。 为了更全面地反映我国上市公司代理成本的总体变动情况，展现公司治理机制对代理成本的作用功效，在两类代理成本同质性的前提下，将两类代理成本置于统一的研究框架下进行分析是必要的。鉴于此，本文选取1999～2004年沪深两市上市公司数据，通过建立面板数据计量模型，分别对各类公司治理机制与两类代理成本的关系进行实证研究。其中，对第一类代理成本研究的结论为：独立董事比例、董事长与CEO两职分离、高管人员股权激励、股权集中度与制衡度、产品市场竞争以及是否获得“清洁”审计意见等对第一类代理成本发挥着制约效应，高管人员薪酬激励并不产生显著作用，而董事会规模、资产负债率与是否“五大”等治理变量却发挥着显著的支持作用。对第二类代理成本的研究结论为：高级经理的薪酬激励、董事会规模、股权制衡度、产品市场竞争以及是否获得“清洁”审计意见等能够发挥显著治理作用，股权激励、独立董事比例提高以及是否“五大”未产生显著影响，而是否两职分离、股权集中度和资产负债率对第二类代理成本起支持作用。 在保持两项研究结果具有高度可比性的条件下，本文对以上结论进行了汇总与整合。在测算出公司治理机制对两类代理成本的综合效应后，根据作用情况的不同，将公司治理机制进行了类别细分与筛选：第一类为“同时对两类代理成本发挥治理效应的公司治理机制”，第二类为“仅对一类代理成本发挥治理效应，而对另一类代理成本无显著影响的公司治理机制”，第三类为“治理效应与支持效应并存，净效应符号很难确定的公司治理机制”，第四类为“仅有支持效应发生作用的公司治理机制”。 以上述实证方法为指导，本文进一步探求了国有与民营上市公司、规模不同上市公司、成长性不同上市公司的两类代理成本的治理状况，对不同属性公司的治理机制与代理成本关系做出深入研究，并通过对比方法突出其各自特征。最终，在两类代理成本理论指导下，根据公司治理机制对总代理成本的综合治理效果，论文总结了研究结论及其政策启示。 关键词：不对称信息；不完全合约；经理人代理成本；控股股东代理成本；公司治理机制 Abstract Under the background of Gradualism of transition, it is a kind of particular economic phenomenon owned by Chinese corporations that agency costs of executives (ACE) and agency costs of controlling shareholder (ACCS) coexist. From the angle of the theory, the concurrence of the double agency costs not only impacts the existent research frame of agency costs, but also severely challenges the effects of the corporate governance institutions. After all, this research approach that is only absorbed in how to reduce ACE or ACCS is not fit for the research of the double agency costs. At the same time, the corporate governance institutions can not act on the double agency costs in parallel and uniformly, and it shall lead to the appraisement for the effect of corporate governance institutions being a difficult problem. In order to reflect the whole things of the agency costs of Chinese listed corporations and set out the effects of corporate governance institutions, it is necessary to take double agency costs into a uniform frame on the premise of the homogeneity of double agency costs. Basing on the upper consideration, this article chooses the data of the listed companies in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 1999 to 2004, and respectively studies the relationship between the corporate governance institutions and two kinds of agency costs experientially by the Panel Data Model. The conclusion about the first agency costs is: these institutions including the proportion of independent directors, the separation between board chairman and CEO，the incentive mechanism of share ownership for top executives, the share centralization and restriction, the product market competition and the obtaining of the clear auditor’s opinion can reduce the first agency costs remarkably, the salary incentive mechanism for top executives has not remarkable effect on the first agency costs, and the size of board, the asset-liability ratio and ‘Top Five’ promote the first agency costs remarkably. The conclusion about the second agency costs is: the salary incentive mechanism for top executives, the size of board, the share restriction, product market competition and the obtaining of clear auditor’s opinion can reduce the second agency costs efficiently, the mechanism of share ownership, the proportion of independent directors and ‘Top Five’ have not remarkable influence on the second agency costs, and the separation between board chairman and CEO，the share centralization and the asset-liability ratio heighten the second agency costs remarkably. At the condition that two research results are highly comparable, this article collects and sums up the upper conclusions. After the measure of synthetic effects of the governance institutions towards the double agency costs, basing on the differences of the effects, it does classify and filter the governance institutions: the first is the institution that simultaneously exerts governance effect on two kinds of agency costs, the second is the institution that only has governance effect on one kind of agency costs, at the same time, has not remarkable influence on the other, the third is the institution with governance effect and promotion effect and with an uncertain net effect, the fourth is the institution only with promotion effect. According to the above-mentioned positive way, the article further explores the governance status to the double agency costs of the state-owned and the private-owned listed companies, companies with different size and companies with different growth. It also deeply investigates the relationship between governance institutions and agency costs for companies with different characters and gives prominence to their characteristics by contrast. Under the lead of the double agency costs, according to the synthetic effect of governance institutions, the article summarizes the research conclusion and the policy inspirations. Key words: Asymmetric Information, Incomplete Contract, Agency Costs of the Executives, Agency Costs of the Controlling Shareholder, Corporate Governance Institutions