董 昀 摘 要 1978年以来，中国的经济波动呈现出以下鲜明的特点：在1990年代中期以前经济增长率剧烈波动，高通货膨胀率周期性的反复出现，该现象所代表的发展的周期性和改革进程的循环往复被称为“活-乱”循环。而1990年代中期之后在保持较高增长速度的同时，经济波动出现微波化态势，周期性的高通胀也不再出现，本文称之为经济波动在适度高位的平滑化。本文试图结合1978年以来经济制度变革的路径特点，探究“活-乱”循环和适度高位平滑波动的成因。 探究中国经济波动现象背后的规律首先要搞清中国经济波动的基本特点。我们首先利用滤波方法，从1979年以来的中国宏观经济数据的原始时间序列中分离出波动成分，并考察各宏观变量与实际GDP之间变动的相关性，提炼1979年以来中国经济波动的特征化事实。 在充分挖掘特征化事实的含义之后，本文结合中国经济制度变迁的基本特点，总结出“活-乱”循环发生的基本机制：分权化和增量改革后，有关决策者的最优行为包括1）效率较低的国有部门和效率较高的非国有部门都愿意争夺价格低廉的信贷资源。2）财政分权改革和政治锦标赛机制使得地方政府愿意支持效率较高的非国有经济更快发展。3）专业银行的地方分支机构利用在分权化改革中获得的信贷支配权将信贷资源更多的配置到非国有部门可以获得较多的收益。在以上各方行为的推动下，信贷资源更多的流向非国有部门，导致非国有部门的发展加快，经济增长加速。为保证国企的生存，在中央财政困难的条件下政府只能增发货币。货币投放过多引发通货膨胀、刺激需求扩张、导致经济过热。政府通过回收信贷管理权来降低通胀，同时也导致需求受到抑制，经济急剧紧缩。 “活-乱”循环的消失与适度高位平滑波动的出现则主要归因于1990年代中期推行的财政、金融、企业等领域的一揽子经济制度变革：1）分税制改革使得补贴国企的任务更多的由国有银行承担，2）国有银行的商业化改革导致银行风险意识增强、注重贷款质量。没有效率的国企无法获得足够的贷款，效率较高的非国有经济获得贷款的比例显著增加且保持相对稳定。3）地方财力的拮据使得地方政府大力推进国有企业“抓大放小”的改革，硬化了企业的预算软约束，减少了国有部门的投资冲动。4）地方国有企业民营化后，剩下的国企多是分布在垄断性行业的中央企业。由于分税制改革后中央财力显著增强，即使需要对其进行补贴，也已不需要通过增发货币来实施，为补贴国有部门增发货币引发通胀和经济过热的机制已经不再有效。此外，本文对宏观调控的改进在熨平经济波动中发挥的作用也进行了简要的分析。本文在逻辑分析的最后一部分强调，在适度高位平滑波动阶段，由于制度改革的不配套所带来的剧烈波动的隐患并未消除。 最后，本文通过回归分析和EG两步法检验了以上的假说。分析结果表明，非国有部门的发展、非国有部门获得信贷比例的提高和财政分权改革的推进可以较好的解释中国经济波动形态从剧烈到平滑的转变，表明本文的逻辑具有一定的解释力。 关键词：经济波动 制度变迁 特征化事实 “活-乱”循环 平滑化 Abstract Since 1978, China's economic fluctuations have presented a remarkable characteristic that: before mid 1990’s, the economic growth rates have high volatility with periodically high inflation rate, this kind of periodical development and repeated reform process is called “boom-bust” circle; while after mid 1990’s, the economic growth rate fluctuated slightly retaining a high speed without periodically high inflation rate any more, the paper calls this phenomenon as economic fluctuation smoothing at a moderately-high level. Based on the path characteristic of China’s economic transformation since 1978, this paper attempts to cut in the phenomenon of China’s economic fluctuations and to explore the origin of “boom-bust” circle and economic fluctuation smoothing at a moderately-high level. Above all, in order to visualize the essential feature of China’s economic fluctuations, the paper uses the filter method extracting the fluctuation ingredient from the primitive time series of China’s macroeconomic data since 1979, investigates the change trend relevance between each macroscopic variable and actual GDP, and extracts the characteristic facts of the economic fluctuations. After fully excavating the connotation of the characteristic facts, based on the essential feature of China’s economic institution changes, the paper summarizes the generator of “boom-bust” circle: Both lowly-efficient state-owned enterprise and highly-efficient non-state-owned enterprise would like to compete for the cheap credit resources. The financial decentralization reform and the political championship mechanism cause the local government to be willing to support a highly-efficient non-state economy for its quicker development. The local branch of specialized bank, making use of its control right to credit resource obtained from the decentralization reform, coordinates with the local government to dispose more credit resources to the non-state-owned enterprise so as to gain more incomes. Therefore, the development of non-state-owned enterprise gets accelerated meanwhile speeding up the economic growth since more credit resources are flowing to non-state-owned enterprise. In order to maintain the survival of state-owned enterprise, the central government has to increasingly issue currency in condition of inadequate fiscal incomes. Subsequently, the excessively release of currency into circulation initiates the inflation, stimulates the demand to expand, causes the economy overheat. In succession, the central government attempts to reduce high inflation rate by drawing back credit authority, simultaneously also causes the suppressed demand and sharp economic contraction. While, the vanishing of “boom-bust” circle and the appearance of economic fluctuation smoothing at a moderately-high level mainly result from the series of economic institutional changes carried out around mid 1990’s in domains of finance, enterprise and so on: The fiscal reform causes the state-owned bank to undertake more duty on subsidy for state-owned enterprise, meanwhile the commercialization reform of the state-owned bank causes the bank to raise its risk consciousness. As a result, the lowly-efficient state-owned enterprise is unable to obtain enough loans. On the other hand, the state-owned enterprise’s transformation of invigorating large ones while relaxing control over small ones, alleviates its budget restraint, promotes the non-state-owned enterprise’s rapid growth. In the system structure which the reform forms, the proportion of credit resources obtained by the non-state-owned enterprise increases remarkably and stably. The original economic fluctuations generator that state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises compete for credit resources is gone. Finally, this paper examines the hypothesis above by regression analysis and the E-G two steps method. The result indicates that, the development of non-state-owned enterprise, the raising credit proportion of non-state-owned enterprise and the centralizing of financial revenue may greatly lead China’s economic fluctuations to shift from fierceness to smoothness, proving the argumentation of the paper makes sense. Key Words: Economic Fluctuations, Institutional Changes, Stylized Facts, Boom-bust Cycle, Moderation