内容提要： 本论文研究了政府控制下的公有制企业的经营者与主管部门的行为选择问题，在公司治理结构研究的框架下，探讨了企业的经营者与主管部门如何在各自面临的约束条件下寻求自身利益最大化的问题。公司治理结构研究的是出资者如何激励和约束代理人，以确保自身的权益不被侵犯的问题，而企业所有权的配置与激励问题是其核心内容。企业所有权由剩余控制权与剩余索取权这两部分组成。在现代企业中，由所有权与经营权分离所导致的剩余控制权与剩余索取权不相匹配的现象已十分普遍，如何解决由剩余控制权与剩余索取权分离所引发的问题，控制与激励经营者按照出资者的意愿行事，保障投资的安全与增加投资的回报，就成了出资者最为关心的事情。在企业的经营中，经营者掌握着信息优势，并且在大多数时候存在激励不相容问题，因而经营者的机会主义行为将难以避免。在不发达经济国家里，特别是在像中国这样的转型国家中，企业在产权安排与激励机制上都存在问题，而这些难以解决的公司治理问题最终将导致出资者权益不断地被侵犯。 在上述的理论框架下，我们对我国的公有制企业进行了初步的研究。运用当代最新发展的企业理论的研究成果，借助于博弈论的分析工具，我们建立了一个分析企业经营者与主管部门行为选择的博弈模型。通过对模型的解的推导，我们发现，在经历了二十多年的企业改革之后，我国的公有制企业依然没有摆脱资产流失与效率损失的双重困扰，企业的主管部门依然面临着加强（或放松）对企业控制与干预的两难选择。通过对我国800家公有制企业连续6年的财务数据的考察，我们发现，主管部门对企业实施的控制与干预越严重，企业的外部贡献增长率就越高，而与此同时内部收益增长率与所有者权益增长率就越低，主管部门无法做到在保证企业高效运行的同时保证国有资产不流失，因而主管部门面临着要提高企业的运作效率还是要保证国有资产不流失的选择问题。另外，我们通过对国有企业实地考察所做的案例分析再次证实了这一结果。所以，我们认为，要根本解决公有制企业特别是国有企业所面临的这个双重困扰，产权改革或许是必由之路；而对于那些在当前条件下难以实施产权改革的企业，就必须能够承受住这个双重困扰，同时，企业的主管部门应该能够在两难选择的困境中找到一个还能让人满意的均衡点。 关键词： 外部贡献增长率 内部收益增长率 剩余控制权 剩余索取权 ABSTRACT This thesis studies the behavior selections of the managers and the supervisors in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and how they maximize the incomes of their own when facing the restrictions in the framework of corporate governance analysis. Corporate governance is the research of mechanism that how the investors of the firm control and motivate the managers to secure their assets. The allocation of the ownership of the firm and the motivation are the most important thing in corporate governance. The ownership of the firm consists of the residual control rights and the residual claim rights. The separation of the ownership and management leads to the separation of the residual control rights and the residual claim rights, therefore, it is necessary for the managers to act according to the investor's or the owner's benefits. Throughout the operation of the firm, the manager has an information advantage over the investor or owner and there always exits an incentive incompatibility between them, so the opportunistic behavior of the manager is unavoidable. In the underdeveloped countries, especially in those transitional countries like China, there are so many problems in the ownership of the firm and incentive mechanism therefore the rights of the investors will be corroded eventually. We explore the SOEs in China under the theoretical framework mentioned just now. By applying the latest research achievements in theory of the firm and the analytical techniques of game theory, we construct a model to study the behavior selections of the managers and the supervisors. The result of the functions in this model shows that although having experienced 20 years' reform the SOEs haven't yet taken off the shackle of the loss in assets and efficiency. Meanwhile the supervisors are still facing the dilemma whether to intensify or to relax the control of the SOEs. The analysis of the financial data of 800 SOEs sequentially lasts for 6 years in China shows that, the more control the supervisor put on the SOEs, the lower of the increasing rate of outside contribution and the reverse of the increasing rate of inside contribution, and vice versa. The failure of the supervisors to retain the efficiency of the SOEs, while avoiding the loss of the assets, leads to the dilemma whether to enhance the operation efficiency or to secure the assets. Furthermore the case study in the appendix reconfirms the result we got beforehand. So we come to the conclusion that the success of property rights reform is the only way out from the dilemma faced by the SOEs, and those SOEs, which could not implement property rights reform completely in present situation must be able to endure the shackle and at the same time the supervisors must be able to find a second-best equilibrium in that dilemma. KEY WORDS Increasing Rate of Outside Contribution Increasing Rate of Inside Income Residual Control Rights Residual Claim Rights 目录 一、引言 1 二、文献综述 2 2.1 现代企业的产生 2 2.2 企业的本质 3 2.3 公有制企业及其产权关系 7 三、公有制企业的改革及一个简单的模型 9 3.1 公有制企业改革回顾 9 3.2 公有制企业改革的实质 10 3.3 一个简单的模型 11 3.3.1 模型的基本描述 11 3.3.2 模型的求解 13 3.3.3 均衡的解释 15 3.3.4 均衡的现实意义 17 四、政府控制对公有制企业绩效影响的一个实证分析 19 4.1 数据库与实证检验设计 20 4.2 实证检验的结果及其解释 23 4.3 小结 28 五、一个简短的结论 29 附录：保留国有企业的代价--东方电气集团案例研究 30 一、东方电气集团公司及其几大子公司简介 31 二、东方电气集团的"市场化"改革 32 三、主管部门与下属企业的关系 33 四、保留国有企业的代价 35 五、小结 37