内容提要 如何构建有效的监管体系，如何提高监管效率，如何使监管适应市场变化，如何在加强监管的同时促进市场发展，这些问题一直为我国期货理论界和实业界所关注。如何在交易所和政府监管当局之间合理配置监管权的问题，关系到监管的有效性及市场的安全、稳定和健康发展，甚为重要。但是，这一问题却被我国期货理论界所忽略。本文集中研究监管权在交易所和政府监管当局之间配置问题，吸收国外学术界对这一问题的最新研究成果，注重采用博弈论、制度经济学和行为经济学等研究方法，以期弥补国内对这一问题研究的不足。全文共分五个部分。 第一章导论，选题的背景和问题的提出。中国期货市场频繁发生市场操纵等市场滥用行为，政府和交易所未能实施有效监管。国外较为成熟的期货市场发生类似事件的程度和频率远低于我国，但也时有发生。世界各国监管部门和研究机构对期货市场监管有效性的新问题高度关注，政府是否应当介入期货市场以及介入之后市场监管权应如何在交易所和政府之间进行分配的问题并没有受到应有的重视。对期货市场政府和交易所监管权分配问题进行研究，对我国期货市场发展具有重要的理论意义和现实意义。目前，我国理论界对期货市场监管权分配问题的研究，不够系统和细致，一些研究比较表浅。本文对期货市场政府和交易所之间监管权分配问题进行系统研究，尝试将监管问题研究引向细致和深入。 第二章进入论文主体部分。首先对会员制交易所的形成原因，组织目标函数和组织结构进行分析。其次，对主张交易所实施全面监管、排斥政府介入监管的观点进行分析，指出其缺陷，并对交易所监管激励机制进行分析，提出交易所不完全监管理论。其次，从成本收益角度，对政府介入期货市场的合理性进行论证，证明在交易所监管激励不足情况下政府介入的有益性及有效性。接下来，运用法律不完备性理论分析政府介入的方式，政府介入期货市场监管主要采取与法院被动式执法不同的主动式执法方式。最后提出主张，期货市场监管通常应采取混合模式。 第三章具体考察政府和会员制交易所监管权分配。期货市场监管分多个方面和多个层面，有必要分层分面详细分析。此部分是对上一章的实证检验和细化分析。本章将期货市场监管细分为市场操纵、合约创新、交易者保护和市场完整性保护四个方面。交易所在防止市场操纵和交易者保护方面激励不足，因此需要政府监管当局介入；在合约创新方面，审核制的事前介入方式成本高昂，应当主要采取核准制方式；交易所在市场完整性保护方面存在足够激励，为防止发生危及整个市场的恶性风险事件，政府监管当局仍有必要适当介入，并在关键时刻承担最后贷款人的责任。 第四章分析期货交易所非互助化与监管权分配。自上个世纪90年代，一些交易所实行了非互助化（Demutualization）改造。非互助化对交易所的组织结构影响巨大。非互助化导致交易所出现了会员之外的所有者。因篇幅和研究范围限制，本文只就与本文议题相关的几个问题进行探讨。首先，分析并指出会员结构变化和电子化交易方式取代公开喊价交易方式促成了交易所非互助化；其次，通过分析并指出非互助化后交易所监管期货市场的激励并没有发生明显改变，与互助化交易所相同非互助化交易所也会采取不完全监管策略；最后，得出结论，政府和交易所之间的监管权分配格局并不需要做重大调整。 第五章，研究中国期货市场监管权分配问题。在我国特殊的经济和政治制度背景下，我国期货市场监管制度以及监管主体和被监管主体都具有自己的“特色”。本部分首先对中国期货监管体系的形成过程和当前市场监管格局作简要的考察和介绍；其次，对交易所监管市场是否有足够激励进行分析，指出我国期货交易所也没有监管市场的足够激励，主要原因在于交易所的垄断地位和政府对交易所的绝对控制；最后对我国期货市场政府和交易所之间的监管权分配以及我国期货交易所的组织制度选择作简要研究，指出当前会员制和公司制都不是我国期货交易所改制的方向，我国期货交易所组织制度改革应当朝着增加相关市场主体在交易所决策中地位的方向发展。 关键词： 期货监管 监管权分配 不完全监管 会员制交易所 非互助化 Abstract How to construct the effective regulation system? How to improve the regulation efficiency? How to adapt the regulation oneself for the changes of market? How to advance the market development, while enhancing the regulation? Futures theorists and practitioners have been paying attention to these issues. Among these issues, one central topic for discussion is how to improve the coordination between government regulation authority and exchange, for the effectiveness of regulation and a safe, steady and healthy development of market is closely related to it. However, this issue has been neglected by the futures theorists in China. The distribution of regulation power between government and exchange is further studied by this thesis. A number of research methods and recent international research results have been adopted in the thesis, in particular the game theory, institution economics and action economics. The objective of this thesis is to contribute to the research of this issue. There are five parts in this thesis. The first chapter is the introduction. It includes the background of the chosen subject, present situation of internal and external research. The frequent abuse use of market manipulation in Chinese futures market is mainly due to the ineffective regulation of government authority and exchanges. The frequency of similar acts in the external mature markets is much lower than in China. The issue about the effective regulation of futures market is becoming a new focus of government authority and research institutions. Whether the government should intervene the futures markets and how to distribute the regulation power between the exchanges and the government? An elaborate research on these issues would have important significance both in theory and in practice. So far, the research about this issue in China is not reasonably systematic and elaborate. This thesis has tried to make some contribution in this field. The second chapter is the main section of the thesis. Firstly, it explained the system of member exchange. The aim function of organization and its structure are analyzed. Secondly, it analyzed the argument which sustains exchange regulation and disagrees with the government intervention, by analyzing the motivation of exchange regulating markets, it pointed out that the exchange does not have the capability to motivate in the regulation of futures markets and proposed the theory of incomplete regulation for exchange. Thirdly, by arguing the cost-benefit, it pointed out that the intervention of government into market is more beneficial. Fourthly, by using the theory of incomplete law, it pointed out that the regulation is the main approach that government enters into the futures markets, which differs with the regulation execution by court. It concluded that the mixed model should been chosen by government for the futures markets regulation through the comparative analysis. The third chapter is to analysis in detail the distribution of regulation power between the government and member exchanges. This part is a more detailed and deeper examination of the precedent chapter. It is subdivided in four parts, namely, market manipulation, innovation of contract, protection of traders and the integrality of market. The exchange has not done enough to prevent the market manipulation and to protect customers, so the intervention of government is necessary. In the field of contract innovation, because of the costly advanced auditing, the regulation approach after the event should be adopted in the case where the motivation mechanism of exchanges functions well for the protection of the market integrity, the regulation of government should still intervene reasonably and take the creditor responsibility in the critique moments. The forth chapter studies the demutualization of exchanges and distribution of regulation power. Since the 1990s, a number of futures exchanged institutional frameworks have undergone the reform demutualization which has greatly influenced the systematical structure of the exchanges. It leads to the appearing the nonmember owners in exchange. In this chapter, I would discuss in detail some related questions instead of a comprehensive analysis which is beyond the sphere of this thesis. Firstly, I would like to point out that the changes in the membership structure and the restitution of out cry by electronic exchanges result in the demutualization in exchanges. Then I analyzed and pointed out the there is no evident changes in the motivation mechanism of the regulation market after the demutualization and a incomplete regulation strategy will be adopted both by the demutualization exchanges and the non-demutualization exchanges. Lastly, I concluded that there is no need for great adjustment of the present regulation power distribution between the government and the exchanges. The fifth chapter is the distribution of regulation power between exchanges and government authority. Because of the particularity of our country's economy and political system, the market's regulation system of our county and the chief part of the regulation system, all have their own features. It is related to developmental history of the Chinese's markets, so the origin these of features can only be found out in the history. At first, it is the simple investigation and introduction to Chinese regulation system. At secondly, I am going to analysis whether our country's exchanges have enough motivation to regulate futures markets, point that exchange doesn’t have enough motivation in regulation markets, and argue that the reason is the monopoly of exchange and the absolute dominate by government authority. At last, analysis simply of the distribution of regulation power between the government authority and the exchanges and choice in organization system of Chinese exchanges. Key Words: Futures regulation Distribution of regulation power Incomplete regulation Membership exchanges Demutualization 目 录 第一章 导 论 1 1．1 选题的背景和意义 1 1．2 国内外研究现状 2 1．3 研究内容与研究方法 4 1．4 论文创新点和局限性 6 第二章 会员制交易所与政府监管权分配 7 2．1 会员制交易所形成原因、目标和组织结构 8 2．1．1 期货交易所选择非盈利性会员制的原因与非盈利性交易所的目标函数 8 2．1．2 会员制交易所组织结构 11 2．2 市场缺陷、交易所不完全监管与政府介入 17 2．2．1 市场缺陷分析 17 2．2．2 交易所不完全监管与政府介入的必要性 22 2．2．3 成本收益分析与政府介入的充分性 38 2．3 法律不完备性与政府介入方式的选择 40 2．3．1 法律不完备性理论 40 2．3．2 期货市场法律不完备程度分析 42 2．3．3 政府介入期货市场方式的选择 45 2．4 期货市场监管模式选择与监管权分配 46 2．4．1 交易所监管和政府监管：一个比较分析 46 2．4．2 监管模式与监管权分配 47 第三章 会员制交易所与政府监管权分配的具体考察 51 3．1 市场操纵的监管权分配 51 3．1．1 市场操纵的界定与识别 51 3．1．2 市场操纵的自阻性和交易所监管的有效性 53 3．1．3 市场操纵的监管措施与监管权分配 56 3．2 期货合约创新的政府监管 59 3．1．1 合约创新的特征 59 3．2．2 政府监管期货合约创新的依据 63 3．2．3 成本收益分析与政府监管期货合约创新的方式 67 3．3 交易者保护的监管权分配 70 3．3．1 中小交易者是否需要保护 70 3．3．2 以政府监管方式给中小交易者保护的依据 73 3．3．3 成本收益分析与监管权分配：以双重交易为例 75 3．4 保证市场完整性的监管权分配 78 3．4．1 结算所——一种保证市场完整性的制度安排 78 3．4．2 交易所（结算所）保证市场完整性的有效性和监管权分配 81 第四章 期货交易所非互助化与监管权分配 85 4．1 期货交易所非互助化的含义和发展状况 85 4．1．1 交易所非互助化的界定 85 4．1．2 期货交易所非互助化的发展状况 87 4．2 期货交易所非互助化的背景和动因分析 87 4．2．1 期货交易所非互助化的背景 88 4．2．2 期货交易所非互助化的动因 95 4．3非互助化改造对政府与交易所监管权分配的影响 103 4．3．1 非互助化对自律监管的影响以及监管权再分配的争论 103 4．3．2 交易所非互助化引发的利益冲突 105 4．3．3 决策权变动、交易所激励与监管权分配 109 第五章 中国期货市场政府与交易所之间的监管权分配 114 5．1 中国期货市场监管权分配体系 114 5．1．1 问题引致的监管体系构建过程 114 5．1．2 当前期货市场监管权分配格局 118 5．2 中国交易所自律监管的有效性分析与监管权分配 121 5．2．1 中国期货交易所的组织结构 121 5．2．2 中国期货交易所监管期货市场的有效性与监管权分配 125 5．3 中国期货交易所组织制度选择与监管权分配 131 5．3．1 中国期货交易所的组织制度选择 132 5．3．2 政府监管当局与交易所之间的监管权分配 134 附录1 近十几年来期货交易所合并一览表 135 附录2 1868-1921年芝加哥期货交易所发生的市场操纵事件 137 附录3 John总结的证券交易所非互助化可能引发的利益冲突的类型 139 附录4 中国商品交易所（批发市场）一览表（截止时间1993年底） 141 附录5 交易所上市合约重复情况表 143 参考文献 144 后 记 162