中英文摘要 本文尝试将西方的利益集团理论和新制度经济学的制度变迁理论引入对俄罗斯制度变迁的研究中，通过对不同时期主导型利益集团的构成、特点及其对政策的影响的考察，以利益集团为切入点对从勃列日涅夫时期到普京时期的制度变迁的发生、发展过程及其所导致的结果进行深入而透彻的论述，为深入了解俄罗斯的制度变迁提供了一个全新的视角。 18世纪麦迪逊最早从派别的角度对利益集团进行了论述，到20世纪50年代杜鲁门第一个对利益集团进行了比较系统的阐述，利益集团理论初步形成。随着利益集团的日趋活跃，利益集团研究也由粗浅到深入，并最终形成了包括多元主义、精英主义、行为主义和制度经济学等不同流派的利益集团理论。行为主义的刺激理论在研究利益集团时更关注集团中的个人动力问题。其中有代表性的是曼库尔·奥尔森的“集体行动”理论和罗伯特·索尔兹伯里的“交换”理论。前者认为，规模是决定对个体利益追求是否会导致有利于集团行为的决定性因素，比起大集团来，小集团能够更好地增进其共同利益。后者进一步将刺激行为的因素归结为物质的、团结性的和为某种目的服务的三种类型，其研究结论是：着眼于物质利益的集团，存在着固有的优点，而后两者则存在着固有的缺点。制度经济学的平衡理论则认为，各个集团之间和集团的成员之间出于自利动机在进行一系列交换活动，它们讨价还价的过程便是政策妥协和调整的过程，它们讨价还价的结果使政治达到暂时的平衡。 前苏联和俄罗斯利益集团与西方利益集团有诸多相似之处，本文认为，可以有选择地将西方利益集团理论移植到前苏联和俄罗斯的利益集团研究中。一方面，二者行动目的相似。与西方利益集团相比，前苏联和俄罗斯的利益集团的目的相对单一，以追逐物质利益为其行动的核心动力。另一方面，二者影响政策制定的途径相似。因为俄罗斯的政治体制与西方国家相同，因此，无论是西方还是俄罗斯的利益集团都必须通过立法、行政和司法三条途径参与政治进程。以上两点说明，可以用西方的利益集团理论分析前苏联和俄罗斯的利益集团，西方理论的适用性很强。 本文的第二个理论基础是以诺斯为代表的新制度经济学的制度变迁理论，在运用诺斯的需求模型和制度变迁步骤对俄罗斯制度变迁进行分析时，本文对诺斯的制度变迁首倡者的外延进行了扩展和补充，将知识分子也作为制度变迁的首倡者；本文还将制度变迁的时滞归结为初级行动团体与次级行动团体达成一致所需要的时间，同时对诺斯的初级行动团体进行了区分，强调只有主导型的行动团体才能成为制度变迁的首倡者。 通过对以上理论的评述，本文将利益集团与制度变迁的关系归纳为：主导型利益集团是制度变迁的推动力，主导型利益集团的性质决定制度变迁的经济绩效，并得出结论，利益集团的存在是合法的，但利益集团的活动应该被限制，借助权威的力量协调利益集团之间的关系是实现制度暂时平衡的前提条件。因此，限制和制衡利益集团的作用是实现最优经济绩效的必要条件。 本文将前苏联和俄罗斯的制度变迁分成四个时期进行考察。勃列日涅夫时期是本文的分析起点。这一时期政府中的特权阶层是既得利益者，它所代表的是各级官员及其家属的利益，并不代表全体社会成员的利益。为了维护他们的既得利益，既得利益集团千方百计阻挠制度的变迁，致使制度最终陷入僵滞状态，经济发展停滞，并最终导致苏联由计划经济体制向市场经济体制变迁。 戈尔巴乔夫时期的利益集团由既得利益集团和得利集团组成，它们围绕制度选择展开博弈。既得利益集团试图采取措施进行有利于本集团的狭义制度变迁，而亲西方的得利集团则为了谋求新制度安排中的潜在收益，竭力推动广义的制度变迁，即由计划体制向市场体制的变迁。在两个集团的博弈中，得利集团最终取得胜利，导致制度发生激烈变迁，这种制度变迁的结果只对该得利集团有利，却给大多数社会成员带来了灾难。 叶利钦时期的主导型利益集团由以总统、政府为代表的执政集团、议会党团组成的利益集团和由强力部门组成的利益集团组成。由于各利益集团的构成和特点不同，他们在制度确立过程中所能够发挥的影响也不同。总统、政府组成的执政集团和议会党团组成的利益集团在宪法所赋予的权力范围内发挥作用，而强力部门组成的利益集团则根据各自的实力发挥影响。三个利益集团在制度确立的具体方式上展开了激烈的博弈，在击败议会党团后，执政集团与强力部门中的金融工业集团相互勾结，制定有利于该集团的政策，在私有化过程中表现得尤为突出，造成国有资产的大量流失。 由于叶利钦时期利益集团对政治经济政策的过度干预，导致俄罗斯当时的制度主要按各利益集团的想法确立，不仅国家陷入危机，全体社会成员也为此付出了惨重的代价。普京执政后下决心整治各利益集团，摆脱它们对政府政策的干预和牵制。依靠由安全部门和检察部门组成的中央官僚机构，普京时期议会中支持政府的力量逐渐占据了优势，各金融寡头的影响力也大大削弱，俄罗斯政治局势出现了空前的团结和稳定局面。这种状态一方面保证了政府政策的顺利实施，另一方面也保证了政府从国家利益出发来制定经济政策的基本原则。因此，这一时期普京政府的政策得到各政治力量和人民的一致认可和支持。普京的支持率一直保持在60%-70%以上。同时，各政治力量和人民的支持和拥护，又为普京在制定政策时以国家利益为重提供了勇气和动力。 本文的结论是，在制度变迁过程中，政府应该对主导型狭隘利益集团进行抑制，而且政府应该尽可能地成为主导型的广泛的利益集团的代表，只有这样，制度变迁才能符合大多数社会成员的利益，才能保证社会的稳定和经济的可持续发展。 关键词：利益集团 博弈 制度变迁 Abstract This dissertation tries to introduce the theory of` the western Interest Groups and the theory of the institutional Change of the New Institutional Economics into researching the Russian institutional change. Through investigating into components, characteristics of the leading interest groups in various period and their influences on polices, it discusses deeply and thoroughly the occurrence, development and results of the institutional change from the Brezhnev's period to the Putin's period from the point of view of interest groups and provides a fully new perspective to comprehend deeply insititutional changes in Russia. In the 18-century Madison first mentioned Interest Groups from the perspective of the faction. In the 50’s of the 20-century Truman first elaborated about Interest Groups and then the theory of Interest Groups was basically formed. Along with Interest Groups’ gradual enlivening, the research into Interest Groups was deepened and finally formed various schools of theory of Interest Groups, including Pluralism, Elitism, Actionism and Institutional Economics and so on. The basic view of the Pluralism is: all of public polices is nothing but the bargain among Interest Groups and that between Interest Groups and the government. The Elitism opposes views of the Pluralism, especially E. Schattschneider’s theory of “upper class favors”. He thinks that the system of Interest Groups is narrow in the scope; there are not so many people to join and it has the prejudice of approving the upper class and enterprises. The Stimulate theory of the Actionism focuses on the personal motivation in the group in research into Interest Groups. The representative theories are Mancur Olson’s theory of Collective Action of and Robert Salisbury’s Exchange Theory. The former emphasizes that the scale is the key factor of whether the seeking toward the individual interest is beneficial to the collective action. Compared with big groups, small groups can better add the common interests. The latter further divides simulative factors into three kinds: Material, Solidary and Purposive. Whose conclusion is: the groups with material purpose have intrinsic advantages and the groups with two other purposes have intrinsic disadvantages. The Equilibrium Theory of the Institutional Economics thinks different Interest Groups and members of the same group exchange each other from selfish motives, the process of their bargain is the same process of compromise and adjustment of the polices and finally makes the politics reach the temporary equilibrium. There are many similar places between Interest Groups in Former Soviet and Russia and the western Interest Groups. This dissertation thinks we can make selective use of some western theories of Interest Groups into the analysis of Interest Groups in Former Soviet and Russia. On the one hand, their purposes of action are similar, compared with the western Interest Groups, the purpose of Interest Groups in Former Soviet and Russia is quite single and their major motivations are material. On the other hand, their ways of influences on the formulating polices are similar. Russia has the same political system with the western countries, so those Interest Groups have the same ways to participate in the government process, that are legislative, administrational and judicial organs. The second theoretical basis of this dissertation is the theory of institutional change of New-Systematic economics represented by D.North. In the analysis of the Russian institutional change applying North’s demand pattern and the step of institutional change, this dissertation extends and supplements the extension of North’s initiate of institutional change, sees also intellectuals as initiates of it; it also sums up the delay of the institutional change as the time which it need that the first action group and the second action group reach agreement, meanwhile distinguishes North’s first action group and emphasizes only the leading action group to be initiate of institutional change. Through the review of above theories, this dissertation sums up the relationship between interest group and institutional change as: the leading interest group is the motive force of institutional change, the characteristic of the leading interest group determines the economic performance of institutional change, and concludes: the existence of interest group is legal, but activities of interest group should be restricted, harmonizing relationships among interest groups by way of forces of authorities is the prerequisite of realizing the temporary balance of institution. So restricting and balancing the role of interest group is the precondition of realizing the optimal economic performance. Investigation into the institutional change of the Former Soviet Union and Russia in this dissertation is divided into four periods. The Brezhnev’s period is the starting point of analysis in this dissertation. The Privileged stratum in the government, the vested interests in this period, represents the interests of officials at all levels and their family members, not the interests of all social members. The vested interests used all their ingenuity to obstruct the institutional change in order to safeguard their vested interest, so the institution fell into a rigid state, the national economy was stagnant and finally caused the Former Soviet Union to transit from the planning economic system to the market economic system. The interest groups in the Gorbachev’s period, consisted of the vested interests and the group of seeking interest, played game in the process of institutional selection. The vested interests tried to take measures to undertake the institutional change in the narrow sense favorable to their groups, but in order to seek the potential profits in the arrangement of the new institution, the pro-westerners the groups of seeking interest promoted energetically the institutional change in the broad sense, namely transiting from planning system to market system. The group of seeking interest won at last in the game of two groups, this caused radical institutional change, that was only favorable to this group, but brought great suffering to the majority people in the society. The leading interest groups in the Yeltsin’s period consisted of the group in power represented by the president and government, the interest groups composed of parliamentary groups and ones composed of powerful sectors. As composition and characteristic of interest groups were different, so their roles in the process of institutional establishment were different. The group in power represented by the president and government and the interest groups composed of parliamentary groups played their roles within the range of power entrusted by the constitution, but the interest groups composed of powerful sectors played their roles according to their actual strengths. Three interest groups played game radically in the specific way of institutional establishment. The Financial-Industrial group among parliamentary groups and powerful sectors colluded with each other and formulated policies favorable to their groups after defeating parliamentary groups, this phenomenon was manifested prominently in the privatization process and caused state-owned assets to lose enormously. Because interest groups in the Yeltsin’s period intervene excessively in the political and economic policies, this caused Russian institutions at that time to establish according to wills of the main interest groups, it not only caused the country to be caught in crisis, but also caused the all people in society pay heavy prices. Putin made up his mind to punish interest groups and get rid of their intervention and containment of governmental policies after he was in power. Relying on the central bureaucratic apparatus composed of security and procuratorial sectors, forces support ing government in the parliament in the Putin’s period gradually won an advantage, the influences of financial oligarchs were weakened greatly, so never before had Russia seen the united and stable political situation. This state, on the one hand assured to implement the governmental policies smoothly, on the other hand assured the governmental basic principles of formulate economic policies proceed from the considerations of national interests. Therefore, policies of the Putin’s government in this period had been supported by political forces and people unanimously. Putin’s support-rate always retained over 60%-70%. Meanwhile the support from political forces and people also provided courage and motive for Putin’s formulating policies proceed from the considerations of national interests. The conclusion of this dissertation is: in the process of institutional change, the government should restrain the leading and narrow interest group and be the representative of the leading and broad interest groups as possible as it can. only in this way, the institutional change can conform to interests of the majority people in the society, assure the stable society and the sustainable development of economy. Key Words: Interest Groups, The Game, Institutional Changes. 目录 导论…………………………………………………………………1 第一章 利益集团与制度变迁理论………………………………4 第一节 利益集团的概念、种类及其功能………………………4 一、利益集团的内涵…………………………………………4 二、几个相关概念的区分……………………………………6 三、利益集团的类型…………………………………………6 四、利益集团发挥作用的途径与达到目的的方式方法……8 第二节 利益集团理论………………………………………………11 一、利益集团理论的提出………………………………………11 二、利益集团理论的发展………………………………………12 三、对利益集团理论的评述……………………………………16 四、西方利益集团理论在本文的适用性………………………17 第三节 制度、制度变迁与经济转轨…………………………………18 一、制度概念及其评述……………………………………………18 二、经济改革、经济转轨与制度变迁……………………………20 三、新制度经济学制度变迁理论的概述…………………………21 第四节 利益集团与制度变迁的关系…………………………………24 一、主导型利益集团是制度变迁推动力…………………………24 二、主导型利益集团的性质决定制度变迁的经济绩效…………26 三、限制和制衡利益集团的作用是实现制度变迁 最优经济绩效的必要条件…………………………………………27 第二章 勃列日涅夫时期既得利益集团与制度的僵滞………………29 第一节 勃列日涅夫时期的既得利益集团………………………………29 一、既得利益集团的形成……………………………………………29 二、既得利益集团的特点……………………………………………33 三、既得利益集团的影响……………………………………………33 第二节 勃列日涅夫时期的制度变迁实践…………………………………34 一、勃列日涅夫时期执政前期的制度变迁实践……………………………34 二、勃列日涅夫时期执政后期的制度变迁实践……………………………37 第三节 勃列日涅夫时期既得利益集团与制度变迁………………………………38 一、既得利益集团在制度变迁实践中的表现………………………………38 二、既得利益集团反对制度变迁的原因……………………………………39 三、既得利益集团反对制度变迁的后果……………………………………40 第三章 戈尔巴乔夫时期的得利集团与制度的选择……………………………42 第一节 戈尔巴乔夫时期的利益集团……………………………………………42 一、狭义制度变迁中的既得利益集团……………………………………42 二、广义制度变迁中的得利集团…………………………………………43 第二节 戈尔巴乔夫时期的制度变迁实践………………………………………48 一、戈尔巴乔夫时期的“根本改革”（1985年-1988年）………………48 二、经济发展模式的重新选择（1988年-1991年底）……………………49 第三节 戈尔巴乔夫时期的利益集团与制度变迁………………………………53 一、利益集团在制度变迁中的表现………………………………………53 二、利益集团抵制或推动制度变迁的原因………………………………57 三、利益集团抵制或推动制度变迁的后果………………………………59 第四章 叶利钦时期的利益集团与制度的确立…………………………………62 第一节 叶利钦时期的利益集团…………………………………………………62 一、利益集团的构成………………………………………………………63 二、利益集团的特点………………………………………………………64 三、利益集团的影响………………………………………………………65 第二节 叶利钦时期的制度确立实践…………………………………………66 一、价格制度的确立………………………………………………………66 二、企业制度的确立………………………………………………………68 第三节 叶利钦时期的利益集团与制度的确立………………………………70 一、利益集团在制度确立中的表现………………………………………70 二、利益集团所确立制度导致的后果……………………………………75 第五章 普京时期利益集团的相对衰落与制度的暂时平衡……………………83 第一节 普京的治国思想…………………………………………………………83 一、普京的俄罗斯思想……………………………………………………83 二、普京的经济思想………………………………………………………84 第二节 普京时期利益集团的衰落……………………………………………85 一、议会中政府反对派的衰落…………………………………………85 二、金融工业集团的衰落………………………………………………87 第三节 普京时期的制度确立实践……………………………………………88 一、法律制度环境的确立…………………………………………………88 二、健康平等的宏观环境的确立…………………………………………89 第四节 普京时期的经济绩效……………………………………………………89 一、普京时期经济绩效………………………………………………………89 二、普京时期取得良好经济绩效的原因……………………………………90 三、制约俄罗斯经济发展的因素……………………………………………91 结论…………………………………………………………………………………94 参考文献……………………………………………………………………………98