中国社会科学院研究生院 博士学位论文 指导教师：张卓元 职称：研究员 系别：经济系 专业：产业经济学 2004年4月 摘 要 管制经济学的传统理论认为，追求以效率为核心的公众利益是政府实行经济管制政策的合理依据和唯一目标。然而，自20世纪50年代起，针对管制效果的经验研究却在很大程度上否定了这一观点，相关的政治经济学理论也深刻指出了其中的逻辑缺陷。借助政治、经济、社会、文化等多个领域中的研究范畴和研究方法，半个多世纪以来西方关于政府管制目标的研究成果可谓汗牛充栋，然而由于相关结论之间分歧巨大，加之中西方的国情差异，致使已有理论在中国的实际应用受到了很大限制。由此，建立适合中国本土环境的政府管制目标理论就成了引发本文写作的初衷。 为掌握西方有关政府管制目标的理论脉络，本文首先对现有的研究成果从理论实证和经验实证两个角度进行了细致地梳理，从中归纳出三种主要观点：公众利益最大化目标、选票最大化目标和预算最大化目标。以此为基础，在对中国的政治结构和决策机制进行分析的基础上，本文提出了中国经济管制决策中，政府追求公众利益最大化的目标假说，并在这一假说的前提下，建立了两个基本模型。模型对现有管制理论的缺陷作了两点修正：一是针对多数理论所认为的，管制政策是利益集团政治竞争的均衡结果，政府只是被动接受者的观点，在模型（一）中引入了“政府可控资源”变量，把政府效用纳入社会总效用，将其看作社会福利的一个重要组成部分，认为通过直接控制社会经济资源可以强化政府的政治安全感，并由此增进其效用水平；二是将公众利益的衡量标准由一维的效率标准，转化为效率和公平的双重标准，在模型（二）中引入了“集团相对初始禀赋”变量。 理论模型的推导结果显示，政府的公众利益目标可以分解为“控制偏好”、“效率”、“资源转移量”和“公平”四大因素。虽然管制政策的制定过程中各种影响因素之间的相互作用是复杂的，但是政府总是按照社会效用最大化原则对这四大因素进行最佳组合，当各因素之间产生冲突和效用抵消作用时，政府就会按照效用择大的原则进行方案的取舍。 为了验证模型及其结论的科学性和正确性，本文利用中国管制机构设置及电信产业价格与进入管制、工农交换品价格管制、非国有经济退出/进入管制等典型的管制案例，从多个不同的视角对中国管制制度的建立、发展及演变进行了政治经济学分析。分析结果均表明，中国政府的管制经济决策目标符合公众利益最大化假说。 关键词：管制 目标 控制偏好 效率 公平 Abstract According to the traditional view of regulatory economics, chasing the efficiency core of public interests should be the principled reason and the only objective of the government economic regulation. But from the 50th of 20 century, the empirical analysis on the effect of government regulation denied this view to a wide extent. The interrelated theories of political economics also pointed its logical defects. With the concepts and the measures of the politics, economics, sociology and culture, since the later half century, there are unnumbered explorations in the origins of government regulation. But because there are so big divergence among those explorations and china has so many differences from western countries that the applying of those theories is much limited in china. Then, founding a new theory of the objective of government regulation, which suits Chinese situation is the main purpose of this paper. In order to hold the skeleton of the western theories, the paper, on the first, carefully analyses the former theories from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. Then, the paper generalizes three main points of view about the actual objective of government regulation: the objective of public interests maximization, the objective of votes maximization and the objective of budgets maximization. On this base, the paper further analyses the Chinese political structure and the mechanism of decision-making, then put forward the hypothesis that the government of china seeks the objective of public interest maximization in his economic regulation decision-making. Under the premise of this hypothesis, the paper erects two basic models. The models amend two shortcomings of the former theories. First, it contra poses the view, which is hold by many theories, that the economic regulation policy is the equilibrium of the political competition among the beneficial groups, and the government is only a passive embracer. Introducing a new variable of “government controllable resources” to the NO.1 model., the paper brings the government utilities into the utilities of the gross society and makes it an important part of the social welfare. Accordingly, it brings forward that through direct controlling the social economic resources, the government can strengthen his feeling of political security and then promote his utilities. The second amendment is introducing a viable of “comparative origin gifts of the groups” into the NO.2 model and turns the scaling of the public interest from the single dimension of efficiency to the double dimensions of efficiency and equity. The deduction of the theoretic models reveals that the government’s objective of public interest can be decomposed into four factors, which are “controlling preference”, “efficiency”, “ scale of transferred resources” and “equity”. Although the reciprocity among these factors is complicated, the government always makes the best combination of them according to the principle of maximizing the social utilities. If the factors conflict or counteract each other, the government will choose the project, which can bring out the maximum utilities. For validating the models and their deductions, the paper analyses the history evolvements of the regulating institutions and several typical regulating cases, including the cases of price and entrance regulation on telecom industry, the price regulation on trading commodities between industries and agriculture and the exodus/entrance regulation on unstated-ownership-economy, etc. With these analyses, the paper goes into the erection, development and evolvement of Chinese regulation system in different angles of view of political economics. All the conclusions reveal, that in china the decision-making objective of regulation policy accords with the hypothesis of public interest maximization. Key words：Regulate Objective Controlling preference Efficiency Equity 目 录 0. 导论 1 0.1 问题的提出 1 0.2 问题的研究角度 2 0.3 研究的方法 3 0.4 基本思路、结构、主要内容和创新点 4 理论篇 1. 文献述评 7 1.1 公众利益最大化目标 7 1.2 选票最大化目标 11 1.3 预算最大化目标 16 1.4 小结 19 2. 中国管制经济决策的一般特征 28 2.1 决策过程的框架分析 28 2.2 决策参与者、权力与目标 34 2.3 小结 41 3. 构建公众利益目标模型 43 3.1 模型构建的基本思路 43 3.2 模型及基本结论 45 3.3 政策含义 53 检验篇 4. 电信业放松管制政策及其绩效分析 56 4.1 电信产业管制及管制放松的一般原因 56 4.2 价格管制放松的背景、过程及绩效 60 4.3 进入管制放松的背景、过程及绩效 65 4.4 小结 68 5. 控制偏好与效率: 中央职能部门的管制权及其分配 70 5.1 中央职能部门的管制权及其分配: 1949——1978年 70 5.2 中央职能部门的管制权及其分配：1978——今 72 5.3 小结 79 6. 效率与生产者/消费者之间的收入分配: 工农交换品价格管制 85 6.1 工农业利益集团相对政治效率分析 85 6.2 工农交换品价格管制的分配与效率结果 88 6.3 小结 101 7. 效率与生产者之间的收入分配 ：非国有经济退出/进入管制 102 7.1 非国有经济的退出与进入管制 102 7.2 放松非国有经济进入管制的效率与分配结果 106 7.3 小结 113 参考文献 117 后 记 123