博士生姓名 文远华 指导老师 吴敬琏 教授 系 别 经济系 专 业 政治经济学 中国社会科学院研究生院 内容摘要 改革开放以来，中国信贷交易的市场化程度已经大大提高，但信贷市场在经济转型时期的一些特征仍然存在。1998-2002年间出现了信贷配给现象：广大农村和中西部地区的企业和居民、全国多数的中小企业普遍反映难以从银行得到贷款；同时，大量资金滞留银行体系。解释信贷配给现象的信贷配给理论在西方已经绵延了半个多世纪，从20世纪50年代在美国盛行的信贷“可能性学说”到70年代中期之后不完全信息下的信贷市场理论，理论经济学的发展在信贷市场上的应用构成了信贷配给理论的脉络。以现代市场经济为背景的信贷配给理论一定程度上适合于中国，但中国经济转型时期的信贷配给现象还需要特别的解释。 论文的模型探讨了下列因素和中国信贷配给现象之间的联系：商业银行对信贷风险的态度变化，在辨别和控制信贷风险上开始投入大量的成本，这一过程会导致信贷配给；商业银行对与法治环境相关的交易成本和抵押品清偿价值的日渐关注会导致信贷配给；宏观经济紧缩时期资产价格下降会导致信贷配给；商业银行经营目标函数偏离利润最大化，近几年金融业改革过程使商业银行目标函数发生变化，这一变化过程可能导致信贷配给；在市场分化的条件下，收益水平低的市场会遭受信贷配给；在经济下滑时期，商业银行尤其会对高风险市场配给信贷；利率市场化使商业银行的存贷利差至少在一段时间内缩窄，利差缩窄可能加重信贷配给的程度；在利率市场化条件下，弱势借款者，包括中小企业，遭受信贷配给的程度可能得到缓解，但支付的贷款利率水平将会升高。 论文探讨了银企关系、抵押品与信贷配给的关系，主要结论有：中国银行业正在经历从关系银行业到价格银行业的转变，这一转变将使银行贷款向风险低、收益高的借款者或项目倾斜，弱势借款者可能更加遭受信贷配给；只有当银行和企业的公司治理结构都比较健全时，银企关系才可能在很大程度上被交易合同中的利率变化所替代，也只有在这种情况下，利率市场化才能使银行有可能用提高利率来补偿贷款风险，从而一定程度降低信贷配给的程度；提高社会诚信环境，明晰产权并完善财产交易制度，有助于缓解信贷配给状况。 论文分析了信贷配给在宏观层面的影响，指出：信贷配给延缓了经济增长的速度；过多借款与信贷配给现象是一个硬币的两面，过多的借款会撑死企业；遭受信贷配给的市场和未受信贷配给的市场并存会造成贫富不均的社会问题；信贷资金从弱势市场向强势市场的流动将使整个社会的福利受损，使两个市场间的投资边际回报差距更加扩大，从而使整个金融体系更加不稳定。 论文还分析了近年来货币政策的传导问题，主要结论有：信贷渠道在中国是传导货币政策的主要渠道；近年来中国货币政策传导“受阻” 以及“松货币”和“紧信贷”现象并存的主要原因是由于经济转型时期的体制性原因使商业银行独立于货币政策配给信贷；如果商业银行的公司治理结构和国家对商业银行的管理体制不能从根本上有所改变，则间接调控的货币政策难以有效。 关键词：信贷配给 转型时期 信贷风险 目标函数偏离 市场分化 银企关系 抵押品 信贷渠道 Abstract Since the end of 1970's, the extent to which the credit market runs according to market rules has been improving, but the special characters of China’s credit market in the transformation process of economic regime also exist. From 1998 to 2002, the credit-rationing phenomenon has been found in China. On one hand, many people and enterprises in rural area and middle-western area have been complaining that it is difficult for them to get credit from banks; on the other hand, a lot of money stagnates in banking system. From the Availability Doctrine in 1950's to the asymmetric information of credit market after the middle of 1970’s, the credit rationing theory that provides the micro-basis of credit rationing has been lasting for more than half of a century. The application process of economics development in credit market constitutes the outline of the credit rationing theory. To some extent the credit rationing theory, which grew under the background of modern market economy, works in China, but the credit-rationing phenomenon in China has to be explained by other special factors relating to the transformation process of China’s economic regime. The model of this paper explores the links between the following factors and the credit rationing in China. The change of banks’ attitude to credit risk may lead to credit rationing; Banks give much more emphasis on the trade cost and the payable value of collateral, which may give rise to credit rationing; The decreasing of asset price during economic stagnation produces credit rationing; The bias of banks’ objective function from the maximization of profit and the transformation of the function relating to the reform of the financial system cause credit rationing; If different parts of the whole markets are not integrated, the credit in the part with low capital return ratio will be rationed. During economic recession, banks tend to ration the credit in the high-risk market; the removing of interest ceiling will narrow down the interest spread of deposit and credit at least during a period, which may strengthen credit rationing; meanwhile, the vulnerable borrowers, including small and middle-sized enterprises, will get more credit from banks even though they have to pay a higher interest rate. This paper also discusses the links between the relationship between banks and enterprises, collateral and credit rationing. China’s banking industry is transforming from relationship banking to price banking, which will lead banks to give more credit to the borrowers and projects with low risk and high return. As s result, the credit of vulnerable borrowers will be much more rationed. The relationship between banks and customers will be substituted with ontract interests, and removing the interest cap can drive banks to compensate risk with higher interest only if the corporate governance of both banks and enterprises stays in a state of scientific check and balance. Besides, improving the social environment of honesty and trust, clearing the property rights will help reduce credit rationing. On the macro-level, the following conclusions are drawn. The speed of economic growth will slow down owing to credit rationing; over-borrowing, which is the other side of the coin, will bring a lot of negative effects to enterprises; the flowing of credit capital from vulnerable market to advantageous market will reduce the welfare of the whole society, and enlarge the gap between these two kinds of markets, which will make the financial system much more fragile. This paper also shed some light on the transmission of monetary polices. Credit channel is the main conduit through which China’s monetary policies affect real economy. In recent years, the transmission of China’s monetary policies was “blocked up”, meanwhile, “ease money ” and tight credit”, which seem conflict with each other, exist together because the China’s banks ration credit with a little influences of monetary polices owing to institutional disadvantages. If the corporate governance of banks and the regime for the country to monitor banks can’t be reformed root and branch, the monetary policies of indirect adjustment and control will not work. Key words: credit rationing, transformation process, credit risk, bias of objective function, market disintegration, collateral, credit channel.