报告题目：Direct Implementation with Evidence

　　主讲：孙一飞

　　主持：欧阳耀福

　　时间：2022年7月20日星期三10:30--12:00

　　线上：腾讯会议号 127-780-673

　　备注：欢迎参会，无需提前报名。如无提问，请注意在讲座过程中保持静音。

　　报告简介:

　　We study full implementation with evidence in an environment with bounded utilities. We show that a social choice function is Nash implementable in a direct revelation mechanism if and only if it satisfies the measurability condition proposed by Ben-Porath and Lipman (2012). Building on a novel classification of lies according to their refutability with evidence, the mechanism requires only two agents, accounts for mixed-strategy equilibria and accommodates evidentiary costs. While monetary transfers are used, they are off the equilibrium and can be balanced with three or more agents. In a richer model of evidence due to Kartik and Tercieux (2012), we also establish pure-strategy implementation with two or more agents in a direct revelation mechanism. We also obtain a necessary and sufficient condition on the evidence structure for renegotiation-proof bilateral contracts, based on the classification of lies.

　　作者简介：

　　孙一飞副教授于2015年在新加坡国立大学获得经济学博士学位，2015年9月加入对外经济贸易大学。主要研究领域为博弈论与信息经济学，侧重于机制设计与实施理论，研究成果发表或接受发表在Journal of Political Economy、Theoretical Economics、Games and Economic Behavior、Journal of Mathematical Economics等高水平国际期刊，并有多篇文章在国际期刊邀请返修（Journal of Economic Theory (R&R）,Theoretical Economics (R&R））。主持并完成国家自然科学基金青年项目一项（从机制设计的角度分析不完全合约的基础）。

　　（编辑：熊晨玮；审校：张佶烨）