报告题目：Signaling versus Auditing

　　主讲：  李建培           

　　点评：  杜创

　　主持：  付明卫

　　时间：  2019年12月03日13:30--15:00

　　地点：  北京市文兴东街1号国谊宾馆南楼2层第1会议室 

　　备注：欢迎参会，无需提前报名。 

　　报告摘要：

　　We analyze a competitive labor market in which workers signal their productivities through education a la Spence (1973), and firms have the option of auditing to learn workers' productivities. Audits are costly and non-contractible. We characterize the trade-offs between signaling by workers and costly auditing by firms. Auditing is always associated with (partial) pooling of worker types, and education is used as a signal only if relatively few workers have low productivity. Our results feature new auditing patterns and explain empirical observations in labor economics like wage differentials and comparative statics of education choices. Our analysis applies also to other signaling problems, e.g., the financial structure of firms, warranties, and initial public offerings.

　　 主讲人简介：

　　李建培，对外经济贸易大学经济学教授、博士生导师。主要从事应用微观理论研究，包括产业组织理论和契约理论，研究题目包括团队生产中的锦标赛机制、最优采购契约的设计、专利授权合约的设计、专家市场侵权责任设计等。多篇论文发表于经济学国际顶尖期刊，包括RAND Journal of Economics, Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of Public Economics (2篇)，International Journal of Industrial Organization等。先后主持国家自然科学基金青年项目及霍英东教育基金会基础性研究项目，曾入选教育部新世纪优秀人才计划，并荣获2018年中国信息经济学乌家培奖。

　　（编稿：孙小雨；审校：王砚峰）